The identification and remediation of a sophisticated supply chain attack targeting the Ethersphere Swarm network requires immediate action if specific compromised versions of the software were deployed in your environment. This guide helps you identify and remediate a supply chain attack targeting the Ethersphere Swarm network. If you used bee-js version 13.3.0 or Swarm Desktop version 0.56.2, your system and wallet credentials may be compromised. You will need access to your application logs, project configuration files, and system service managers to complete this procedure. These malicious releases were discovered after attackers compromised the Ethersphere release automation to distribute wallet-stealing malware and backdoors. Because the malicious code executes automatically upon installation or application launch, any system that interacted with these specific versions must be treated as fully compromised.
Remediate Ethersphere Supply Chain Compromise
1. Choose a Method
Determine if you are affected by checking for malicious versions in your environment through a systematic review of logs and package manifests. For developers using the JavaScript library, search all lockfiles, package caches, and continuous integration logs for the specific string @ethersphere/[email protected]. Note that version 13.3.0 was active on the npm registry for approximately 75 minutes and may have been pulled in automatically by other packages like swarm-cli or bee-dashboard. For those running the graphical interface, check the bee-desktop.log file for the specific entry line: “Bee Desktop version: 0.56.2 (production).” This log file is typically located in ~/Library/Logs/Swarm Desktop/ on macOS, %LOCALAPPDATA%Swarm DesktopLog on Windows, and ~/.local/state/Swarm Desktop/ on Linux systems. If these versions are found, assume the machine is fully compromised because the malware executes as a post-install script in the library or immediately upon the desktop application’s launch. The loader code is designed to hide network errors, meaning a lack of error messages in your installation logs does not indicate a safe state.
2. Prepare the Accounts
Secure your digital assets from a clean, uninfected computer to prevent the malware from intercepting new credentials or transactions. For Swarm Desktop users, the malware specifically targets the swarm.key file and the config.yaml file, which contains the node password in plain text. You must immediately move all node funds, including xDAI and xBZZ tokens, as well as checkbook balances and stakes, to an entirely new private key. This transfer must be initiated from a device that has never run the compromised software. Developers and system administrators must rotate every password, API token, and cryptographic key that the compromised user or CI runner had the authority to read. This includes GitHub tokens, npm registry keys, and any cloud service credentials stored in environment variables or configuration files. Because the attackers utilized stolen CI credentials to publish these malicious releases, any secret stored within the affected repository’s automation environment must be considered leaked and replaced.
3. Update the Software
Remove the malicious code by updating to verified clean versions and purging contaminated artifacts from your development pipeline. Pin the bee-js dependency strictly to version 13.2.0 and clear all cached copies of version 13.3.0 from local environments, global npm caches, and any internal npm mirrors or registries your organization uses. For Swarm Desktop users, update to version 0.56.3 immediately, which is a clean release signed with a newly issued Developer ID certificate. While the auto-updater for Windows and macOS should move installations of 0.56.2 to the safe version automatically, Linux users must manually replace the package to ensure the malicious version is completely gone. Version 0.56.3 contains the same functional code as the earlier 0.56.1 version but removes the attacker-introduced loader. Ensure that your CI/CD workflows are updated to require manual approval for signing jobs and that they only run from protected main branches to prevent similar automated injections in the future.
4. Remove Persistent Backdoors
Manually delete the malware’s persistence mechanisms from your operating system, as standard software updates or uninstalls do not remove these hidden components. Delete the ~/.solidity/ folder on Linux and macOS, which houses the evjawbreaker remote shell. Specifically, you must stop and remove the solidity-langsupport-runner.service user service on Linux and the com.solidity.langsupport.runner LaunchAgent on macOS. On Windows systems, the malware installs a genuine ScreenConnect remote-access client that runs as a system service; you must locate and remove the ScreenConnect Client (5cbe79c9c25524df) service. Be aware that the Windows payload may have added an exclusion to Microsoft Defender and attempted to bypass User Account Control prompts to gain administrator rights. The evjawbreaker shell is particularly dangerous because it reads its control server address from an Ethereum smart contract, allowing attackers to redirect the backdoor to new infrastructure at any time without updating the local malware code.
5. Finalize System Recovery
Confirm the removal of all indicators of compromise by auditing your network traffic and file system integrity. Check for unauthorized outbound connections to the domain frameworkmetrics[.]xyz or specific IP addresses, including 193[.]57[.]9[.]155 and 185[.]232[.]84[.]169. You can verify the integrity of your binaries using SHA-256 hashes; for example, the linux_amd64 payload has a hash of 9b73e7cd4e1425e770392549d8df46c706139ef476f4f7b9ac405165dc8d9696. Other relevant hashes include fae61f31f00988fdc5cc9e7272b51e08af2e245d81003237875415930fd27358 for darwin_arm64 and 7527e86d70e7c9493db4356f1c3775380431b310000f2602c1e993cf435d01da for the Windows app.msi. Look for HTTP headers containing X-Ethersphere: 1 in your proxy or firewall logs as a sign of previous malicious communication. Whenever possible, the safest result is achieved by rebuilding the affected machine from a trusted, clean image rather than attempting to clean the infected operating system in place, as backdoors can be deeply embedded within the system registry or hidden directories.
Steps Recap
- Identify the presence of bee-js 13.3.0 or Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 by auditing package lockfiles and local application logs.
- Transfer wallet funds and rotate all accessible credentials, including API tokens and node keys, using a clean device.
- Revert to bee-js 13.2.0 in your dependencies and install Swarm Desktop 0.56.3, performing manual updates on Linux.
- Delete hidden folders like .solidity and remove specific background services used for remote access persistence.
- Monitor network logs for frameworkmetrics traffic and consider a full system wipe to guarantee total environment security.
Conclusion
Supply chain attacks like the Ethersphere incident demonstrate that even signed software can be dangerous if CI/CD credentials are stolen by malicious actors. Once you have moved your funds and cleared the specific backdoors mentioned in this guide, maintain a habit of pinning dependencies to specific, audited versions rather than using broad range descriptors. Always monitor project advisories for version-specific warnings to prevent future unauthorized access to your node or development environment. This attack highlights the importance of zero-trust architectures where even legitimate release channels are verified against known safe states. Implementing multi-factor authentication for all publishing accounts and requiring manual oversight for automated builds in 2026 is essential for preventing similar compromises. Vigilance in monitoring network indicators and maintaining offline backups of critical keys remains the best defense against evolving digital threats. By following these remediation steps, you can restore the integrity of your Swarm operations and protect your assets from ongoing exploitation. Your proactive response ensures that the decentralized network remains resilient against sophisticated adversaries targeting the software development lifecycle. Maintain a rigorous schedule for rotating secrets and stay informed about the latest security disclosures from the Ethersphere maintainers to keep your infrastructure secure.
