In a speculative scenario set in 2030, China reacts aggressively to Taiwan’s application for UN recognition as an independent state, leading to a full military invasion and attempts to cripple Taiwan’s critical infrastructure. This scenario was the basis for a wargame exercise organized by the US Naval War College, involving technology specialists, infrastructure experts, and hackers to identify and address potential vulnerabilities.
The Wargame Exercise
Organizing the Wargame
In August 2022, the US Naval War College conducted a wargame exercise at the Black Hat and DEF CON security conferences in Las Vegas. Participants were divided into teams and tasked with examining and stress-testing Taiwan’s critical infrastructure in a three-hour session. This event led to the identification of 65 actionable recommendations to strengthen Taiwan’s defenses in anticipation of potential conflicts in 2030. The exercise was thoroughly discussed at the ShmooCon infosec conference in Washington DC by the two Naval academics overseeing it, providing detailed insights and findings. Notably, these wargames are not mere theoretical exercises; they form a crucial part of the Navy’s Taiwan Resilience Project aimed at finding optimal solutions for safeguarding Taiwan’s critical infrastructure against rapidly evolving threats.
Scenarios and Findings
The exercise presented two scenarios: a purely online attack targeting Taiwan’s data, power, and other critical infrastructure, and a more comprehensive scenario incorporating military attacks and acts of sabotage. These dual scenarios underline the multifaceted nature of modern warfare where conventional military tactics are complemented by cyber warfare to maximize disruption. One of the primary takeaways from these exercises was the stark vulnerability of Taiwan’s current critical infrastructures. Investigations revealed significant gaps and weaknesses that could be exploited to destabilize the region. The findings from these exercises have underscored the urgent need for reforms and the implementation of sophisticated countermeasures to thwart future threats.
Vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s Infrastructure
Internet Infrastructure
One of the primary findings was that Taiwan’s current internet infrastructure is exceedingly fragile, with 97% of its data arriving via 16 undersea cables, three of which are routed through China. The recent severing of one of these cables has only underscored this vulnerability. Jason Vogt, an assistant professor at the Strategic and Operational Research Department (SORD) and the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, emphasized that internet access in Taiwan is considered on par with essential utilities. Despite significant investment in strengthening its satellite communications infrastructure, there is a growing consensus that more substantial measures are urgently needed to prepare for potential cyber conflicts. The precarious nature of Taiwan’s digital connectivity requires an overhaul to create robust redundancies and minimize dependencies on external entities, particularly those with potentially adversarial inclinations.
Efforts to diversify Taiwan’s data transmission methods have led to exploring collaborations with Amazon’s Project Kuiper and investments in Eutelsat OneWeb, deemed safer due to the UK’s protective “golden share” mechanism. Recently, Taiwan has shown a keen interest in engaging with private sector entities to bolster its internet resilience. Notably, Taiwan does not fall under the coverage of SpaceX’s Starlink, partly due to Elon Musk’s statements regarding Taiwan’s political status, which have caused skepticism. By focusing on such alternative satellite communication networks, Taiwan seeks to diminish its reliance on vulnerable undersea cables and improve its overall resilience against external sabotage and disruptions.
Power Supply
The issue of power supply was also identified as a notable vulnerability. With most of Taiwan’s nuclear reactors decommissioned and a heavy reliance on imported coal and gas, Taiwan’s energy security remains precarious. The country’s aim to transition to renewable energy sources like solar and offshore wind is a commendable initiative; however, it is fraught with challenges. While local environmental movements have advocated against nuclear energy, favoring greener alternatives, the transition introduces its own set of complications. China’s dominance in the solar panel market poses a strategic concern, including potential cybersecurity risks related to smart grids and renewable energy systems. Additionally, the heavy reliance on imported fossil fuels makes Taiwan susceptible to global market fluctuations and supply chain disruptions.
With Taiwan unable to rely solely on domestic energy production, there is an urgent need to diversify energy sources and incorporate advanced smart grid technologies to manage energy distribution efficiently. This could help mitigate the inherent vulnerabilities of the existing centralized grid system. Furthermore, investing in innovations such as microgrids and distributed energy resources could provide Taiwan with more resiliency in its energy infrastructure. By decentralizing energy production and distribution, Taiwan can reduce potential targets and create a more sustainable and secure energy network that can withstand external attacks and internal failures alike.
Alternative Communication Technologies
Bluetooth Mesh Networks
To strengthen communications resilience, the wargame assessed the feasibility of alternative technologies, such as leveraging Bluetooth mesh networks. Given the high density of mobile phones among the Taiwanese population, these networks could facilitate peer-to-peer communication in the event of a compromised cellular infrastructure. By creating a decentralized communication network using existing Bluetooth technology, Taiwan could maintain a level of communication even if traditional infrastructure were disrupted. Bluetooth mesh networks are advantageous as they are relatively easy to deploy and can function with minimal external oversight, making them a practical solution in emergency scenarios.
These networks operate by allowing devices to communicate with each other directly, enabling messages to hop from one device to the next, creating a web-like communication structure. This approach not only improves redundancy but also enhances overall network reliability. Employing Bluetooth mesh networks could reduce the impact of targeted cyber or physical attacks on communication systems by providing a backup method for message transmission across the population. Furthermore, continuous advancements in Bluetooth technology promise improved range and data throughput, making it an increasingly viable option for maintaining critical communication channels.
Advanced Microwave Technology
Additionally, advanced microwave technology was proposed as a method for transmitting information across Taiwan’s mountainous terrain, thereby enhancing the resilience of local communications infrastructure. This technology could play a critical role in maintaining communication lines in difficult-to-reach areas, ensuring that information flow remains uninterrupted despite geographical challenges. Microwave technology operates at high frequencies and can transmit large amounts of data over considerable distances with minimal latency. The strategic deployment of microwave links could significantly contribute to a robust and resilient communications framework.
One of the notable benefits of microwave communications is their immunity to jamming and interception compared to traditional radio frequency methods. This makes them an ideal choice for securing communications in a conflict scenario. Utilization of microwave bursts can provide secure and reliable data transmission, ensuring that critical communication channels remain operational and secure. By diversifying its communication strategies to include both Bluetooth mesh networks and advanced microwave technology, Taiwan can create a more resilient and multilayered communication infrastructure capable of withstanding a variety of threats.
Unconventional Ideas and Civilian Involvement
Civilian Corps and Stockpiling
The exercise also prompted unconventional ideas, such as training a civilian corps in network repair and hacking, and stockpiling essential communication equipment like cell towers and cables. This approach would ensure that Taiwan has a rapid response capability in the event of infrastructure damage. By equipping civilians with the necessary skills and resources, Taiwan can create a community-driven model for network resilience. This participatory approach not only improves readiness but also fosters a sense of collective responsibility and engagement among Taiwanese citizens, enhancing overall national morale during crises.
In including civilians in network repair efforts, Taiwan could drastically reduce recovery times after an attack, thereby maintaining continuity of services and minimizing disruptions. Training would cover essential skills in networking, cybersecurity, and rapid deployment of communication infrastructure components. Stockpiling critical equipment, such as mobile cell towers and redundant cabling, would ensure a robust inventory to quickly restore damaged or destroyed sections of the network. Ultimately, the civilian corps would act as first responders, ensuring that communication systems remain operational even in the midst of concerted cyber and physical assaults.
Historical Artifacts as Protection
An offbeat suggestion included using Taiwan’s historical artifacts, which were brought to the island by Chiang Kai-shek in 1949, as a protective measure for key infrastructure, presuming their cultural significance might deter physical attacks. This interesting idea draws on the notion that the historical and cultural importance of these artifacts could dissuade aggressors from targeting sites that house them. Using these artifacts as a form of defense aligns with the broader strategy of psychological warfare, aiming to invoke a sense of cultural preservation to mitigate or avoid direct conflicts.
By leveraging historical artifacts, Taiwan can protect vital infrastructure while subtly underscoring its rich cultural heritage. However, this strategy would require careful planning and a thorough understanding of the potential risks and benefits. The approach could act as a complementary measure to more conventional defensive strategies. Although unconventional, such strategies highlight the innovative thinking necessary to address modern warfare challenges. Combining cultural heritage with tactical defense might provide an added layer of deterrence, making adversaries think twice before targeting crucial sites.
Public and Private Wargame Sessions
Public Session at DEF CON
The second round of the wargame, held publicly on the DEF CON floor, attracted substantial attention and highlighted vulnerabilities with alarming accuracy. Some Navy officials, including the deputy director of Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs, who attended the event, were impressed by the results. This session’s open format brought greater visibility to the potential threats faced by Taiwan, serving as a wake-up call to both the public and officials. The transparency of this session helped garner broad support for implementing necessary changes to defend Taiwan against future cyber and physical threats.
The public wargame also facilitated crucial dialogues among cybersecurity professionals, technical experts, and policymakers. The collaborative environment fostered the exchange of ideas and best practices, further refining the actionable recommendations identified during the exercise. By engaging with the broader hacker community, the session leveraged diverse expertise to simulate a well-rounded defense strategy. This inclusive approach not only validated the findings but also highlighted new innovative solutions that could be incorporated into Taiwan’s defense planning.
Private Session in Taiwan
Following the public session, the team was invited to conduct a private wargame session in Taiwan with local officials and hackers, further refining the strategies and recommendations. This private session allowed for a more in-depth analysis of Taiwan’s specific vulnerabilities and defensive capabilities. By collaborating closely with local entities, the team could tailor the solutions to the unique geopolitical and infrastructural challenges Taiwan faces. The private format ensured that sensitive information could be discussed openly, leading to a more comprehensive and meticulously crafted defense strategy.
During the private session, participants focused on enhancing inter-agency cooperation and bolstering Taiwan’s cybersecurity framework. The hands-on engagement with local officials fostered a better understanding of the operational realities in Taiwan, leading to practical and actionable strategies. By aligning defense measures with local capabilities and needs, the wargame exercise achieved a significant step towards creating a resilient and adaptive national defense system. The combination of public and private sessions ensured a holistic approach to addressing Taiwan’s security concerns, integrating both broad perspectives and detailed local insights.
Strategies for Mitigating Risks
Clustering Critical Infrastructure
The overarching findings indicated three potential strategies for Taiwan to mitigate the risks of a Chinese attack. The first strategy suggested building clusters of critical infrastructure away from the vulnerable western shore to protect civilian centers. Clustering involves consolidating essential facilities in secure, less accessible locations, reducing the immediate threat to civilian populations. However, this concentration of critical sites poses its own challenges, as it could create highly targeted focal points for adversarial attacks. Peripheral defenses and robust security measures would be essential to safeguard these clusters from coordinated strikes.
Strategically relocating critical infrastructure inland could mitigate the risk of coastal attacks but necessitates considerable investment in developing new facilities and supporting infrastructure. Moreover, extensive planning would be required to ensure that relocated sites remain functional and connected to existing networks. The idea of clustering presents a foundational shift in defense strategy, balancing the need to protect civilian areas with the imperative to secure vital resources and services. This approach pushes the boundaries of traditional infrastructure planning, emphasizing resilience and strategic depth.
Radical Decentralization
The second strategy proposed radical decentralization by establishing numerous small, easily repairable communication stations powered by renewable energy. This strategy aims to disperse potential targets, complicating attack efforts for China and enhancing overall system resilience. Decentralization leverages the principle of redundancy, ensuring that damage to individual nodes does not cripple the entire network. This approach is particularly effective in mitigating risks from both cyber and physical attacks, creating a heavily distributed network that is inherently harder to disrupt.
Implementing a decentralized network enhances the flexibility and adaptability of Taiwan’s critical infrastructure, allowing for rapid recovery and continuous operation even under duress. By combining renewable energy sources with modular communication stations, Taiwan can ensure that these nodes remain self-sufficient and operational in various scenarios. This strategic pivot towards decentralization represents a forward-thinking approach to national resilience, aligning with global trends in smart city planning and sustainable infrastructure development. It necessitates comprehensive planning, resource allocation, and innovative engineering to bring to fruition.
Leveraging Mountainous Terrain
In a speculative scenario set in 2030, China reacts aggressively to Taiwan’s application for UN recognition as an independent state. This reaction culminates in a full-scale military invasion, with China also aiming to cripple Taiwan’s critical infrastructure. This hypothetical situation formed the basis for a wargame exercise organized by the US Naval War College.
The exercise brought together a range of experts, including technology specialists, infrastructure experts, and hackers. Their goal was to identify and address potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited in such a conflict. These professionals worked together to simulate and analyze the challenges Taiwan might face in the event of such an aggressive move by China. The wargame highlighted the importance of preparedness and robust defense mechanisms to safeguard against cyber-attacks and other forms of aggression. Overall, the exercise underscored the need for international cooperation and advanced strategies to maintain stability and security in the face of potential threats.