With deep expertise in AI, machine learning, and blockchain, IT professional Dominic Jainy has a unique vantage point on the evolving digital threat landscape. Today, he joins us to dissect the RondoDox botnet, a nine-month campaign that has successfully weaponized the critical React2Shell vulnerability. We’ll explore the technical underpinnings of this widespread threat, the calculated evolution of the attackers’ strategy, the aggressive tactics used to maintain control of infected devices, and the defensive measures organizations must take to protect themselves.
The RondoDox botnet exploits the critical React2Shell flaw, CVE-2025-55182. Can you walk us through the technical details of this remote code execution vulnerability and explain why it’s so effective for hijacking over 90,000 web servers and IoT devices on such a massive scale?
React2Shell is particularly devastating because it strikes at the heart of modern web development with a CVSS score of a perfect 10.0, which is as critical as it gets. The vulnerability lies within React Server Components, a technology used by frameworks like Next.js. It allows an unauthenticated attacker—meaning anyone on the internet—to execute code remotely on a susceptible server. There’s no complex authentication to bypass or user interaction needed. The sheer scale is what makes it a goldmine for botnet operators. When you have a flaw this severe affecting over 90,000 publicly accessible instances, with a massive concentration of 68,400 in the U.S. alone, it’s like leaving the front door unlocked on an entire city block. Attackers can automate scans and compromises with terrifying efficiency.
The RondoDox campaign evolved over nine months from manual scans to hourly automated deployments. What does this three-phase progression reveal about the threat actor’s resources, and how does incorporating older N-day vulnerabilities alongside React2Shell broaden their pool of potential targets?
This evolution paints a very clear picture of a patient and methodical adversary. They didn’t just appear overnight with a massive operation. The initial phase, from March to April 2025, was all about manual reconnaissance—they were testing the waters, learning the landscape. Then they graduated to daily mass probing, which shows an increase in automation and resources. The final leap to hourly, large-scale automated deployments from July onward signifies a fully mature, well-oiled attack infrastructure. It’s a classic development lifecycle, but for malware. Incorporating older N-day flaws like CVE-2023-1389 is a brilliant, if cynical, strategy. It acknowledges that not everyone patches immediately. By targeting both the latest critical flaw and a backlog of known, unpatched vulnerabilities, they maximize their victim pool, catching not only those who are slow to react to new threats but also those who have been neglecting basic security hygiene for years.
The article highlights a loader, “/nuts/bolts,” that aggressively kills rival malware and non-whitelisted processes. Could you elaborate on the tactical advantage of this mechanism, and what it tells us about the competitive landscape of IoT botnet infections today?
That component is absolutely fascinating from a tactical perspective. It reveals that the IoT ecosystem is a brutal, contested battleground. A compromised device is valuable real estate, and threat actors are fighting each other for it. The “/nuts/bolts” loader isn’t just an installer; it’s an enforcer. By continuously scanning the system’s processes every 45 seconds and terminating anything it doesn’t recognize—including competing botnets, miners, and even artifacts from previous campaigns—it ensures RondoDox maintains exclusive control. This aggressive territorialism gives them a stable, dedicated platform for their operations without having to share computing resources. It tells us that modern botnet operators have to build in not just offensive capabilities against their targets, but also defensive capabilities against their rivals.
Beyond patching Next.js and segmenting IoT devices into VLANs, can you detail a step-by-step process for how an organization can monitor for suspicious executions, like the Mirai variant mentioned, and effectively hunt for this botnet’s C2 infrastructure within their network?
Of course. Patching and segmentation are your first lines of defense, but a proactive hunting strategy is crucial. First, you need deep visibility. This means establishing a baseline of normal process activity on your servers. You should be using endpoint detection and response tools to monitor for any suspicious process executions, like the sudden appearance of a binary named “/nuts/x86,” which we know is a Mirai variant. Second, focus on network traffic analysis. Hunt for anomalous outbound connections from your web servers or IoT VLANs. A compromised device will need to call home to its command-and-control server. Look for patterns of communication to unusual IP addresses or ports. Third, once you spot a suspicious connection, correlate it with threat intelligence feeds for known RondoDox C2 infrastructure. Finally, when you confirm an infection, immediately isolate the device from the network to prevent lateral movement. Then, perform forensics to understand the full scope, ensuring you remove all persistence mechanisms, like the cron jobs it establishes in “/etc/crontab.”
What is your forecast for the evolution of IoT botnets like RondoDox, especially concerning their use of critical, widespread vulnerabilities like React2Shell?
My forecast is that the window between a critical vulnerability’s disclosure and its mass exploitation by botnets will shrink to almost zero. We’re moving toward a reality where automated systems will be scanning for and weaponizing flaws like React2Shell within hours, not weeks or months. Botnets will become more opportunistic and “hybrid,” combining brand-new, high-impact vulnerabilities with a long tail of older, reliable exploits to ensure the widest possible reach. Furthermore, the “in-fighting” we see with the “/nuts/bolts” component will intensify. We can expect future botnets to feature even more sophisticated self-preservation and anti-competition modules, making them more resilient and harder to eradicate once they gain a foothold. The speed and aggression of these campaigns are only going to increase, making proactive defense and rapid patching more critical than ever.