Allow me to introduce Dominic Jainy, a seasoned IT professional with a remarkable depth of knowledge in cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and blockchain. With a keen eye on emerging threats, Dominic has closely followed the evolution of tools that challenge modern security systems. Today, we dive into a critical discussion about RealBlindingEDR, an open-source tool that has sent ripples through the cybersecurity community by targeting antivirus (AV) and endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems at the kernel level. In this interview, we explore how this tool operates, its impact on security software, the risks it poses to organizations, and the strategies ransomware groups have adopted to exploit it.
Can you start by explaining what RealBlindingEDR is and how it impacts AV and EDR systems on Windows?
RealBlindingEDR is an open-source tool that emerged in late 2023, designed to disrupt antivirus and endpoint detection and response systems by manipulating kernel-level operations on Windows. Essentially, it clears critical kernel callbacks—mechanisms that security software relies on to monitor system activities like process creation or file operations. By wiping these callbacks, the tool can blind, disable, or even terminate AV and EDR solutions, leaving systems vulnerable to attacks without triggering immediate alerts.
How does RealBlindingEDR exploit signed drivers to access the Windows kernel?
The tool takes advantage of vulnerable signed drivers, such as echo_driver.sys or dbutil_2_3.sys, which allow arbitrary read and write operations in memory. Since these drivers are signed, they can load into the kernel without raising red flags. Once loaded, RealBlindingEDR uses them to gain deep access to the Windows kernel, bypassing built-in protections and enabling it to manipulate sensitive structures and functions at a very low level.
What specific kernel callbacks does RealBlindingEDR target, and why are they so critical to security software?
It focuses on six major types of kernel callbacks, including those set by functions like CmRegisterCallback for registry monitoring, ObRegisterCallbacks for object handle protection, and PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine for tracking process creation. These callbacks are the backbone of AV and EDR systems—they allow real-time monitoring of suspicious behavior. When RealBlindingEDR removes them, security tools lose visibility into critical system events, making it nearly impossible to detect or block malicious activity.
Could you walk us through how this tool locates and alters kernel structures like PsProcessType or FltGlobals?
Absolutely. RealBlindingEDR starts by identifying global kernel structures like PsProcessType or FltGlobals using exported functions from core system components like ntoskrnl.exe and fltmgr.sys. Once located, it navigates through linked lists of callback entries tied to these structures. It then either nullifies the function pointers or reroutes the list heads, effectively disabling the callbacks. This process is meticulous to ensure the system remains stable while stripping away security oversight.
What measures does RealBlindingEDR take to avoid system crashes or triggering safeguards like PatchGuard?
The tool is designed with caution to sidestep PatchGuard, a Windows mechanism that protects the kernel from unauthorized modifications and can cause a blue screen if tripped. RealBlindingEDR carefully manipulates callback lists without altering protected kernel regions directly. It avoids aggressive overwrites that might destabilize the system, ensuring that its changes are subtle enough to evade detection while still achieving its goals.
How does the tool ensure compatibility across a wide range of Windows versions, from 7 to 11, and various server editions?
The developers behind RealBlindingEDR have built adaptability into its core. It accounts for differences in kernel structures and callback implementations across Windows versions by dynamically mapping out the system it’s running on. This allows it to adjust its approach based on the specific OS build, whether it’s an older Windows 7 machine or a modern Windows 11 setup, as well as various server editions, making it dangerously versatile.
Can you describe the three primary outcomes RealBlindingEDR achieves when targeting security systems?
Certainly. First, there’s the “blinding” mode, which prevents AV and EDR tools from monitoring sensitive activities like malware deployment or privilege escalation. Second, it can permanently disable security solutions by deleting protected files or registry entries after removing callbacks, and this often persists even after a reboot. Finally, it enables the outright killing of AV or EDR processes by stripping away protections that normally prevent termination, allowing attackers to shut down defenses completely.
How have ransomware groups, such as Crypto24, leveraged RealBlindingEDR in their attack campaigns?
Ransomware operators like Crypto24 have integrated RealBlindingEDR into multi-stage attacks with devastating effect. They typically deploy it early in the attack chain to neutralize endpoint defenses before moving to data encryption. By blinding or disabling security tools, they ensure that their malicious payloads can execute without interference, significantly increasing the likelihood of a successful ransom demand.
Given that the tool’s creator claims it’s for research purposes only, do you believe this holds up considering its real-world misuse?
Honestly, while the disclaimer of “research purposes only” might be the creator’s intent, it’s hard to ignore the reality. Tools like RealBlindingEDR, with detailed documentation and easy-to-use executables, often end up in the wrong hands. The fact that ransomware groups have already adopted it shows that its potential for harm outweighs the ethical boundaries set by such disclaimers. It’s a stark reminder of the dual-use nature of cybersecurity tools.
What risks does RealBlindingEDR pose to organizations, especially since it only needs admin rights and a signed driver to function?
The risks are enormous. Since it only requires admin privileges—something attackers often obtain through phishing or other means—and a signed driver, the barrier to entry is disturbingly low. Once deployed, it can render an organization’s endpoint security useless, leaving systems open to data theft, ransomware, or other exploits. The fact that it avoids alerting central management systems during an attack makes it even harder to detect until it’s too late.
What steps can organizations take to protect themselves from threats like RealBlindingEDR?
Organizations need to adopt a multi-layered defense strategy. First, enforce strict driver signature policies and monitor for the loading of vulnerable drivers. Second, use advanced EDR solutions with behavioral analytics to detect kernel-level anomalies. Third, maintain least-privilege access to limit the impact of compromised admin accounts. Finally, regularly review endpoint logs for unusual system file accesses and keep systems patched to minimize vulnerabilities.
Looking ahead, what is your forecast for the evolution of kernel-level evasion tactics like those used by RealBlindingEDR?
I anticipate that kernel-level evasion will only grow more sophisticated. We’re likely to see tools targeting additional mechanisms like Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) providers or Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) callbacks, further eroding visibility for defenders. As Microsoft and AV vendors strengthen kernel protections, attackers will pivot to more obscure or undocumented kernel features. It’s a cat-and-mouse game, and unfortunately, the stakes are only getting higher for organizations worldwide.