With a distinguished background in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and blockchain, Dominic Jainy has a unique perspective on the evolving landscape of digital threats. Today, we delve into the latest CISA advisory, which has added four actively exploited vulnerabilities to its KEV catalog. Our conversation explores the tactical challenges these alerts present, from responding to zero-day exploits that predate public disclosure to defending against sophisticated supply chain attacks. We’ll also discuss the strategic nuances of vulnerability prioritization and what it takes for organizations, both public and private, to build a resilient patching program in the face of persistent threats.
The Zimbra remote file inclusion flaw, CVE-2025-68645, was reportedly exploited starting in January 2026. What specific challenges do organizations face when an exploit predates public disclosure, and what are the first three steps a security team should take upon seeing it added to the KEV catalog?
When an exploit is in the wild before it’s publicly known, you’re immediately on the back foot. It’s like finding out a burglar had a key to your house for weeks before you even knew the lock was broken. The attacker has a significant head start, and your defensive telemetry and logs might not have been configured to even spot the malicious activity. The first step is always immediate triage: use your asset inventory to confirm if you’re even running the vulnerable Zimbra version. Second, you have to assume the worst. You isolate any identified systems and kick off a forensic investigation, scrutinizing logs and network traffic going back to at least January 14, 2026, looking for any signs of that file inclusion. Finally, and this has to happen in parallel, you patch. You get to version 10.1.13 or later as if the building is on fire, because digitally, it might be.
The eslint-config-prettier vulnerability, CVE-2025-54313, stemmed from a supply chain attack where maintainers were phished. Beyond technical controls, what organizational measures can be implemented to protect open-source projects from such credential harvesting campaigns? Please provide some concrete examples of these measures in action.
Technical controls are crucial, but the eslint-config-prettier incident shows that the human element is often the weakest link. The most effective organizational measure is building a culture of healthy paranoia, especially for open-source maintainers. This starts with targeted security awareness training that simulates the exact kind of phishing emails maintainers received in this campaign—bogus account maintenance requests. Another powerful measure is implementing a “four-eyes” principle for publishing new package versions. This means no single person, regardless of their status, can push a new release; it must be reviewed and approved by at least one other trusted maintainer. Finally, projects should establish secure, out-of-band communication channels to verify any unusual or sensitive requests, preventing an attacker from using a compromised email account to socially engineer their way to more access.
CISA’s latest update includes flaws with vastly different CVSS scores, from 5.3 for Vitejs to 9.2 for the Versa Concerto platform. How should a security team’s response differ between a moderate and a critical vulnerability, and what metrics should they use to justify their prioritization choices?
The response difference is night and day; it’s about moving from a managed process to an emergency incident. A 9.2 vulnerability like the authentication bypass in Versa Concerto is a “drop everything” event. It screams total system compromise, so the response is immediate, likely involving after-hours work and emergency change control procedures. For a 5.3 flaw like the one in Vitejs, the response is more measured. It’s still serious, but you can likely follow standard patching timelines. The key metric for justifying prioritization, beyond the CVSS score, is context. Is the vulnerable asset internet-facing? Does it process sensitive data? Most importantly, is it on the KEV catalog? The fact that CISA has confirmed active exploitation of even a 5.3 flaw elevates its real-world risk far above its numerical score, making it a much higher priority than an unexploited 7.0.
Federal agencies must patch these four vulnerabilities by February 12, 2026. For a private sector company not bound by this directive, what is a realistic timeline for addressing these confirmed threats, and what internal processes are needed to meet such a deadline consistently?
For the private sector, mirroring the federal government’s aggressive two-to-three-week timeline for actively exploited vulnerabilities should be the goal, not the exception. A realistic timeline for a mature organization is within 14 to 30 days. To achieve this consistently, you need several foundational processes. First is a comprehensive and dynamic asset inventory; you can’t patch what you don’t know you have. Second, you need a robust vulnerability management program that can quickly ingest alerts like this, identify affected systems, and assign risk. Finally, and this is often the hardest part, you need a streamlined yet safe emergency change management process that allows IT operations to test and deploy critical patches without getting bogged down in bureaucracy.
What is your forecast for software supply chain security?
I believe we are just seeing the beginning of a major shift in how adversaries operate. The attack on eslint-config-prettier and the other npm packages is a blueprint for the future. Instead of throwing resources at heavily fortified corporate networks, attackers will increasingly target the softer underbelly of the software supply chain: the open-source projects that everyone relies on. These projects are often maintained by a handful of volunteers, making them prime targets for phishing and social engineering. Consequently, we’re going to see a huge push for greater transparency through mechanisms like Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs), but the real battle will be cultural—convincing thousands of disparate open-source communities to adopt stricter security hygiene. It will be a long and challenging road.